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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
The District Court Erred In Reversing Trusdall's DUI Conviction 
A. Introduction 
The district court reversed Trusdall's misdemeanor DUI conviction on two 
independent bases. First, it determined as a matter of statutory construction that 
a UTV is not a "motor vehicle" for purposes of a DUI prosecution under l.C. § 18-
8004. (R., Vol. I, pp.55-56.) Alternatively, it concluded that Trusdall's conduct of 
operating a UTV while intoxicated was governed exclusively by l.C. § 67-7114 
and, as such, the prosecutor lacked discretion to charge Trusdall under l.C. § 18-
8004. (R., Vol. I, pp.56-59.) The district court erred. The plain language and 
legislative history of l.C. § 49-123(2)(g) - which defines "motor vehicle" for 
purposes of l.C. § 18-8004 - make clear that a UTV is a "motor vehicle" for 
purposes of a DUI prosecution under l.C. § 18-8004. (See Appellant's brief, 
pp.6-14.) Moreover, while the provisions of l.C. §§ 18-8004 and 67-7114 
somewhat overlap, they do not conflict and, as such, the prosecutor had 
discretion to charge Trusdall under either statute. (See Appellant's brief, p.14-
20.) Trusdall offers a number of arguments in response, many of which are 
unremarkable, and none of which have merit. 
B. The State Did Not Waive Its "Plain Language" Argument 
In its opening brief, the state argued that the plain language of l.C. § 49-
123(2)(g) makes clear that a UTV is a "motor vehicle" for purposes of a DUI 
prosecution under l.C. § 18-8004. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-10.) Trusdall urges 
this Court to disregard the state's "plain language" argument, contending the 
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state never raised it below. (Respondent's brief, pp.5-6.) Even assuming the 
truth of this contention, Trusdall's waiver argument is unavailing because the 
issue she contends is not properly before this Court was necessarily raised by 
Trusdall's challenge to her conviction and was also actually decided (against the 
state) by the district court. 
It is well settled that issues not raised below may generally not be raised 
for the first time on appeal. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 
976 (2010). Trusdall raised the issue she claims was not preserved by arguing 
to the courts below that a UTV is not a "motor vehicle" for purposes of Idaho's 
DUI statute. Even if Trusdall had not raised the issue herself, exceptions to the 
preservation rule exist in the case of fundamental error, see, ~, id., or where 
the issue was decided by the lower court, see State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 
554, 961 P.2d 641, 645 (1998); the latter exception clearly applies in this case. 
The issue in this case is, and always has been, one of statutory 
interpretation - i.e., whether a UTV meets the statutory definition of "motor 
vehicle" as that term is used in l.C. §§ 18-8004 and 49-123(2)(g). (R., Vol. I, 
pp.5, 27-35, 53-59; R., Vol. II, pp.12-18, 26-37, 43-46, 64-70.) In resolving this 
issue, both the magistrate and the district court examined the plain language of 
l.C. § 49-123(2)(g). (See R., Vol. I, pp.53-56; R., Vol. II, pp.44-45.) In fact, the 
district court, in its appellate capacity, specifically relied on the plain language of 
l.C. § 49-123(2)(g) to reach the conclusion that a UTV is not a "motor vehicle" for 
purposes of a DUI prosecution under l.C. § 18-8004. (R., Vol. I, pp.55-56.) 
Because the district court decided the issue below, the state is entitled to argue 
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the correctness of the district court's ruling on appeal to this Court. 1 See, ~. 
DuValt, 131 Idaho at 554, 961 P.2d at 645 (matters actually decided by lower 
court may be reviewed on appeal). Trusdall's argument to the contrary is without 
merit. 
C. A UTV Is A "Motor Vehicle" For Purposes Of Idaho's DUI Statute 
In its opening brief, the state argued that both the plain language and 
legislative history of l.C. § 49-123(2)(g) evidence the legislature's intent that a 
UTV is a "motor vehicle" for purposes of a DUI prosecution under l.C. § 18-8004. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.6-14.) Addressing only the "plain language" aspect of the 
state's argument, Trusdall contends that a UTV "designed for off road use is not 
a 'motor vehicle' under Idaho law." (Respondent's brief, p.7.) To support this 
argument, Trusdall points solely to the language in l.C. § 49-123(2)(g) requiring 
compliance with "federal motor vehicle safety standards" ("FMVS standards") 
and contends that, because the UTV Trusdall was operating did not meet FMVS 
standards, it was not a "motor vehicle" as a matter of law. (Respondent's brief, 
pp.7-9.) Trusdall's argument on this point is merely a rehashing of the district 
court's interpretation of the statute (Compare Respondent's brief, pp.7-8 with R., 
Vol. 1, pp.55-56) and should be rejected for the reasons already cited by the 
1 The state notes that, even if the issue weren't "preserved" merely by virtue of 
the district court's ruling, this Court would still be obligated under governing legal 
standards to examine the plain language of l.C. § 49-123(2)(g) to resolve the 
issue presented by this appeal - i.e., whether a UTV is a "motor vehicle" for 
purposes of Idaho's DUI statute. See, e.g., State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 
208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009) (court freely reviews interpretation of statute and, in 
doing so, begins with examination of literal words). 
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state in its opening brief (see Appellant's brief, pp.6-10 (requirement for 
compliance with FMVS standards, by its plain language, applies only "for the 
purpose of titling and registration" and does not otherwise limit the definition of 
•;motor vehicle")). 
Without addressing any of the specifics of the state's "plain language" 
argument, Trusdall distorts it, claiming "the State now argues that a 'motor 
vehicle' should be defined as any self propelled vehicle," such that even "a 
child's remote control car would be considered a 'motor vehicle."' (Respondent's 
brief, pp.8-9.) Trusdall clearly miscomprehends the state's position. The plain 
language of l.C. § 49-123(2)(g) does define a "motor vehicle" as "[e]very vehicle 
which is self-propelled" but specifically excludes from that definition "vehicles 
moved solely by human power, electric personal assistive mobility devices and 
motorized wheelchairs or other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from 
titling or registration requirements under title 48, Idaho Code." l.C. § 49-
123(2)(g). Because, as set forth in the state's opening brief, UTVs are "self-
propelled" vehicles not exempt from titling or registration requirements - and 
because the statutory requirement for compliance with FMVS standards applies 
only "for the purpose of titling and registration" - a UTV, unlike a child's remote 
control car, meets the statutory definition of "motor vehicle" under l.C. § 49-
123(2)(9). (See Appellant's brief, pp.8-10.) 
Aside from mischaracterizing the state's "plain language" argument, 
Trusdall offers little in the way of support for her claim that a UTV is not a "motor 
vehicle" as a matter of law. She does not explain how interpreting the statute to 
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exclude UTVs from the definition of "motor vehicle" is consistent with the plain 
language of every word and clause of I. C. § 49-123(2)(g). Nor does she even 
attempt to explain away the legislative history, cited to by the state in its opening 
brief, that unequivocally demonstrates the legislature's intent to include UTVs in 
the statutory definition of "motor vehicle." (See Appellant's brief, pp.11-14.) 
Instead, she invokes the rule of lenity to claim that any ambiguity in the statute 
must be construed in her favor. (Respondent's brief, p.12.) Contrary to 
Trusdall's assertions, the rule of lenity does not apply. 
The rule of lenity applies only if a criminal statute still remains ambiguous 
after applying all other rules of statutory construction. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 
641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (2001); State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 
P.2d 685, 688 (1999). "[T]he rule of lenity only applies if, after considering text, 
structure, history, and purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or 
uncertainty in the statute such that the Court must simply guess as to what [the 
legislature] intended." Barber v. Thomas, _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 2499, 2508-
09 (2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Abbott v. U.S.,_ 
U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 18, 31 n.9 (2010) (the mere "grammatical possibility of a 
defendant's interpretation does not command a resort to the rule of lenity if the 
interpretation proffered by the defendant reflects an implausible reading of the 
[legislative] purpose" (internal quotations omitted)). For the reasons already set 
forth in the state's opening brief, the text, structure, history and purpose of l.C. § 
49-123(2)(g) demonstrate the legislature's intent to include UTVs in the definition 
of "motor vehicle" for purposes of enforcing Idaho's DUI statute. (See 
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Appellant's brief, pp.6-14.) Having failed to even respond to the state's 
arguments regarding the legislative history and purpose of l.C. § 49-123(2)(9), 
Trusdall has failed to make a credible argument for application of the rule of 
lenity. 
Because correct application of the rules of statutory construction 
demonstrate that a UTV is a "motor vehicle" for purposes of l.C. §§ 18-8004 and 
49-123(2)(9), the district court's conclusion to the contrary should be reversed. 
D. The State Properly Charged Trusdall Under l.C. § 18-8004 
The district court vacated Trusdall's DUI conviction based in part on its 
conclusion that the prosecution of Trusdall under I. C. § 18-8004 was improper 
because another statute, l.C. § 67-7114, specifically criminalizes the operation of 
UTVs while intoxicated. (R., Vol. I, pp.56-59.) For the reasons set forth in the 
state's opening brief, the district court's conclusion that the prosecutor lacked 
discretion to charge Trusdall with DUI under l.C. § 18-8004 is contrary both to 
the reasoning of State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 987 P.2d 290 (1999), and to 
principles of statutory construction that require statutes dealing with the same 
subject matter to be construed harmoniously. (See Appellant's brief, 14-20.) 
Trusdall argues in response that Barnes is "distinguishable and not 
controlling here." (Respondent's brief, p.9.) Specifically, she appears to contend 
that, unlike the statute at issue in Barnes (which criminalized the operation of a 
snowmobile on a public roadway while intoxicated), l.C. § 67-7114 (which 
criminalizes the operation of snowmobiles, motorbikes, UTVs, specialty off-
highway vehicles and A TVs on public roadways, highways, or off-highway while 
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under the influence) is not "truly harmonious" with the provisions of l.C. § 18-
8004. (Respondent's brief, pp.10-11.) In support of this position, Trusdall points 
to the obvious distinction between the two statutes - i.e., "Section 67-7114 
specifically addresses conduct involving recreational vehicles, . . . whereas, 
section 18-8004 applies to any 'motor vehicle."' (Respondent's brief, p.10 
(footnote omitted).) Trusdall's reliance on this distinction for the proposition that 
the statutes are conflicting is hardly persuasive, however, as it is virtually the 
same distinction rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court as a basis for finding the 
statutes conflicting in Barnes. See Barnes, 133 Idaho at 381-82, 987 P.2d at 
293-94. 
Trusdall's assertion that Barnes is not controlling is also belied by the 
Barnes Court's conclusion, cited in the state's opening brief, that the legislature 
enacted l.C. § 67-7114 - the very statute at issue in this case - simply to make 
clear that "operation of a snowmobile on a public roadway or highway while 
intoxicated results in the same legal consequences as the operation of any other 
motor vehicle while intoxicated," and that such enactment did "not mean Barnes 
was improperly charged under l.C. § 18-8004." Barnes, 133 Idaho at 384, 987 
P.2d at 296. There is no reasoned basis, and Trusdall has offered none, for 
concluding that l.C. § 18-8004 applies to intoxicated snowmobile operators 
whose conduct is also made criminal by l.C. § 67-7114, but not to intoxicated 
UTV operators whose conduct is also made criminal by the same statute. 
Finally, Barnes held that, where criminal conduct is covered by two 
statutes, and the statutes do not conflict, the state has the discretion to 
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prosecute under either statute. Barnes, 133 Idaho at 382, 987 P.2d at 294. To 
the extent Trusdall attempts to avoid prosecution under I. C. § 18-8004 by 
pointing out that a different statute, l.C. § 67-7114, criminalizes virtually identical 
conduct (see Respondent's brief, pp .11, 13-14), such argument is nonsensical. 
Because the statutes do not conflict, the prosecutor had discretion to charge 
Trusdall under either l.C. §§ 18-8004 or 67-7114. The district court's opinion to 
the contrary should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
intermediate appellate decision and reinstate Trusdall's DUI and open container 
convictions. 
DATED this 3rd day of September 2013. 
RI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney G 
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